We provide a simple model of sticky nominal debt contracts and fixed rate debt that can easily be embedded in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Once linearised, the debt process increases the order of autoregressive dynamics in the system by one; thus potentially introducing more complex adjustment processes.
This paper presents a simple model of nominal debt contracting that can be readily incorporated into a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Our motivation for so doing is based on the following observations:
1. Collateralized nominal debt contracts are the norm in most countries with reasonably stable in ‡ation 2. Adjustments to such contracts are relatively costly, and hence relatively infrequent 3. Many such nominal contracts are written on a "…xed rate" basis Although a number of papers examine dynamic general equilibrium models with nominal debt (e.g. Aoki et al (2002) ) very little attention has been paid to the stickiness of such contracts. Yet nominal debt stickiness is arguably easier to understand than product price stickiness. A well-known criticism of the standard model of product price stickiness is that the "menu costs" that ultimately must generate stickiness are unlikely to be large. In the case of debt contracts, in contrast, the costs of adjustment may well be distinctly larger, since typically this will involve re-assessment of collateral or other features of creditworthiness.
Of course, if the nature of debt contracts is to have …rst-order e¤ects, some households face (or act as if they face) a binding credit constraint. A comprehensive discussion of this issue can be found in Mankiw (2000) .
Financial institutions
Financial institutions make loans to households based on nominal contracts.
We assume that debt contracts are sticky in nominal terms. To capture this in a tractable way, we progress by analogy to Calvo's (1983) model of the aggregate price level. We assume a constant probability that any given debt contract will be adjusted in the next period, with complete adjustment towards its optimal value if adjustment does take place.
The key point is that households facing a binding credit constraint will always accept any new debt that …nancial institutions o¤er them. This means that, at least in some neighborhood of a steady state in which the credit constraint binds, we can model the level of debt as determined by …nancial institutions.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) we assume that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless they are secured. The optimal value of debt is then given by some constant fraction (which we normalize to unity) of households'collateral K. A …nancial institution faces costs in deviating from this level. If it lends more than this level, part of the debt is unsecured and it faces default risk on this unsecured portion. If it lends less, the cost arises from foregone pro…t opportunities. We assume this cost, t , is quadratic in the deviation of real debt from its optimal level 1 :
where Z t+1 is the nominal value of a new debt contract set at time t which will be in force from period t + 1, and P is the price level.
When a …nancial institution is able to reset the value of its outstanding contracts, it does so to minimize the cost of the debt deviating from its optimal value over the expected contract period:
where is the …rm's discount rate. The …rst-order condition is
In what follows we assume K t is constant. The steady state ratio of the real value of a new contract 2 , Z R to collateral is then: 2 In the steady state the nominal value of a contract and the price level will be growing at the same rate hence their ratio, the real value of the contract, will be constant state with zero in ‡ation, in which case linearizing (3) gives
where lower case letters denote log deviations from steady state, F is the forward shift-operator (F i x t = x t+i ) and B (F ) = 1 (1 ) F . This condition gives the expected value of a new real debt contract at time t + 1 in terms of the expected path of in ‡ation.
To develop the intuition behind this equation, assume that in ‡ation follows a …rst-order autoregressive process with positive persistence 3 ,
where 0 < < 1 and " t is a white noise error. Then (5) can be rearranged to give
where = (1 ) 2 (1 (1 ) ) 1 is increasing in . If in ‡ation is above its steady state value, the more persistent is in ‡ation, the higher the real value of the contract chosen by …nancial institutions when they reset the contract's value in nominal terms since the faster it will be eroded.
Aggregate debt
At time t, a proportion (1 ) i of …nancial institutions will have reset their contracts at time at time t i and have not had the opportunity to reset them since. So we can sum over all contracts and all …nancial institutions to obtain the real value of aggregate debt at the end of period t
Linearizing this gives
where A (L) = 1 (1 ) L and L is the lag operator (L i x t = x t i ).
Substituting for z t+1 from (5) gives:
Again, the intuition behind this equation can clari…ed by assuming that in ‡ation follows the AR(1) process in (6) We can then rewrite (10) as
and with further rearrangement obtain
where
and
The left-hand side of (12) is the nominal value of debt issued during period t. The …rst term in the square brackets on the right-hand side captures the adjustment of new nominal debt contracts to the current deviation of real debt from its optimal value (given by collateral). If, for example, in‡ation was high at some point in the past, the impact of even a temporary shock will, given the autoregressive process for in ‡ation, have a permanent impact on the price level, and hence the average real value of debt will have been reduced below the real value of underlying collateral (with the degree of the reduction being greater, the more persistent is in ‡ation). As a result, new debt contracts will involve a degree of catch-up, to bring debt back up to collateral.
The second term in square brackets captures the impact of expected future in ‡ation on the optimal value of the new contract. Given the assumed AR(1) nature of in ‡ation, this will in turn be a function of the current in ‡ation rate.
Floating and …xed rates
The interest rate payable on debt can be either ‡oating or …xed. If some proportion of borrowers holds …xed rate debt, the average rate payable by credit-constrained borrowers on outstanding debt will be
where R t is the the short-term nominal interest rate 4 and R F t the nominal interest rate payable on …xed debt. Financial institutions will choose the (fairly priced) …xed rate on a particular debt contract, R z t , as the average of expected nominal rates over the duration of the contract:
The average …xed rate R f t payable by borrowers will then be
Linearizing around a steady state where R is constant so
The system for debt then consists of two endogenous variables r D t and d t , two equations (10) and (20) which relate them to exogenous variables r t and t . We have introduced two new parameters, , the probability of a …nancial institution being able to reset its contract (the average length of contracts being given by 1 1
) and , the proportion of debtors in …xed rate schemes. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for the average length of …xed rate debt to be di¤erent from the average life of a ‡oating rate contract.
Implications for System Dynamics
We can write our two additional equations in the general form
A(L)r
Both variables share the common …rst-order AR lag polynomial, A(L).
Sticky debt contracts thus increase the order of autoregressive dynamics in the system by one. Without introducing undue additional complexity to the model, this nonetheless raises the possibility of more "interesting" dynamic adjustment processes than those which arise from most standard dynamic general equilibrium models.
